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The Supreme Court’s 2014-2015 Term: The Year
the Administrative State Trembled
The opinions of the Supreme Court’s most recent term indicate that the
court’s conservative justices are rethinking the scope and power of the
administrative state.
September 3, 2015 By Joel Alicea
In the weeks since its dramatic conclusion, the Supreme Court’s 2014-2015
term has been called one of the most liberal in decades, with almost all of
the Court’s landmark rulings hailed by the left and condemned by the right.
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Quietly, however, the past term witnessed an important intellectual shift
among the conservative justices: an increasing willingness to rethink the
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the power of federal agencies. Across
several cases spanning various doctrines, all  ve of the conservative
justices expressed views that called into question signi cant aspects of the
administrative state and that could move the Court in a more conservative
direction in the years to come.
King v. Burwell
The most high-pro le example occurred in King v. Burwell, the much-
anticipated A ordable Care Act case. The question in King was whether the
Act authorized subsidies to be o ered on exchanges established by the
federal government, even though the operative provision of the Act only
mentioned subsidies for exchanges “established by the State.” Some,
including the court of appeals, believed that the statute was ambiguous
and invoked a doctrine known as Chevron deference. Chevron deference is
a judge-made rule of administrative law that requires courts to defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous federal statute.
Chevron’s role in buttressing the administrative state is di cult to
exaggerate. As the chief justice himself has observed, “Chevron is a
powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal” because
“[c]ongressional delegations to agencies are often ambiguous,” leading to
widespread judicial deference to agency-favored statutory interpretations.
In King, applying Chevron would have meant ruling in favor of the
government’s view that the subsidies could be o ered on federal
exchanges.
Although the Supreme Court held that the subsidies could lawfully be
made available on federal exchanges, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion—which Justice Kennedy joined—disclaimed any reliance on
Chevron deference. During oral arguments, Justice Kennedy had suggested
that it would be “a drastic step” to permit an agency—rather than Congress
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—to decide such a momentous question as whether the subsidies would
be available on federal exchanges. In line with this comment, the chief
justice’s opinion explained that when interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision implicates matters of “deep economic and political
signi cance,” Chevron deference might not apply.
This rule had been established in an earlier case called FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., but its continuing vitality was an open question
before King. The chief justice made it central to the reasoning in King,
signaling a potential revival of the Brown & Williamson rule and a shift away
from deference to agencies in important cases.
Earlier Evidence: Growing Skepticism of Agency Power
King was not the  rst time Chief Justice Roberts had voiced skepticism of
agency power and the scope of Chevron deference. In the 2013 case City of
Arlington v. FCC, the chief justice wrote a celebrated dissent—again joined
by Justice Kennedy, as well as by Justice Alito—arguing that “the danger
posed by the grow ing power of the administrative state cannot be
dismissed,” and calling for a more limited view of Chevron deference.
Roberts pointed out the “vast power” and “signi cant degree of
independence” that agencies possess. After quoting Madison’s famous
statement in Federalist No. 47 that the “accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly be
pronounced the very de nition of tyranny,” Roberts went on to observe
that agencies accumulate all three powers into their own hands as a
“central feature of modern American government.” Coming only two years
after City of Arlington, the chief justice’s opinion in King suggests that he and
Justice Kennedy are prepared to take a more skeptical, jurisprudentially
conservative view of agency power.
This move away from deference to agencies during the past term was even
evident in the opinions of justices often portrayed as defenders of Chevron
—Justice Scalia foremost among them. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
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Association, Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion arguing that
Chevron deference is in tension with the Administrative Procedure Act’s
requirement that courts “decide all relevant questions of law” and
“interpret . . . statutory provisions,” and he urged that a related deference
doctrine—what is sometimes called Seminole Rock deference—be
abandoned.
As Justice Scalia has observed, Seminole Rock deference, in practice,
Seminole Rock has appeared increasingly vulnerable in recent years, as
more justices—led by Justice Scalia—have said that they are willing to
consider overruling it.
But while Scalia has been a strong critic of Seminole Rock, he is usually seen
as one of Chevron’s greatest champions, authoring the majority opinion in
City of Arlington that gave agencies expansive authority to de ne the scope
of their own powers. When Scalia detected in City of Arlington that “the
ultimate target [was] Chevron itself,” he forcefully rejected the challenge
and rea rmed Chevron. The importance of Justice Scalia’s Perez opinion
must be seen against this background. For one of Chevron’s principal
advocates to impugn its legitimacy—even if ultimately declining to call for
its repudiation—is a striking development.
Reexamining the Administrative State
What was more striking, however, was Justices Thomas’s repeated push for
a sweeping reexamination of the jurisprudence surrounding the
administrative state. In several separate opinions, Justice Thomas
questioned the constitutionality of some of the administrative state’s main
is Chevron deference applied to regulations rather than statutes. The
agency’s interpretation will be accepted if, though not the fairest
reading of the regulation, it is a plausible reading — within the scope of
the ambiguity that the regulation contains.
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features. In both Michigan v. EPA and Perez, he strongly implied that the
deference doctrines of Chevron and Seminole Rock are unconstitutional. In
Thomas’s view, because the Constitution vests legislative, executive, and
judicial power in the three respective branches, it would violate the
Constitution to permit the branches to reallocate their powers amongst
themselves. This idea—called the nondelegation doctrine—has been
consistently rea rmed by the Supreme Court, but it has not been used to
invalidate a delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch since
1935.
Citing the nondelegation doctrine, Thomas argued that Chevron and
Seminole Rock rest on a presumed delegation to agencies of lawmaking or
judicial power in violation of the Constitution’s vesting clauses that begin
each of its  rst three articles. This was a genuine jurisprudential shift for
Justice Thomas, who had previously articulated an expansive view of
Chevron deference in a 2005 opinion called National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X and who had joined Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in City of Arlington.
Sometimes, the Court’s conservatives went even further. Justice Thomas
laid the intellectual foundation for his Perez and Michigan opinions in his
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
concurrence. There, he made an extended case for enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine in general, not just in the context of Chevron and
Seminole Rock.
Justice Alito likewise authored a separate opinion in Association of American
Railroads arguing that the Constitution does not permit agencies to wield
legislative or judicial power—or at least not to the extent that they
currently do. After noting the carefully designed lawmaking process
prescribed by the Constitution, Justice Alito remarked, “It would dash the
whole scheme if Congress could give its power away to an entity that is not
constrained by those checkpoints.” In arguing for a reinvigoration of a
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judicial check on interbranch delegations of power, Justices Thomas and
Alito took on a principal premise of the administrative state: the delegation
of power from Congress to agencies to make law on major questions of
public policy.
Pushing Back against the Legacy of the New Deal
These signi cant statements from the Court’s conservative justices did not
arise in a vacuum. Rather, they are part of a broader push within the
conservative legal movement for renewed resistance to agency power.
Most of the administrative state’s current features arose during the New
Deal era, when the Court sustained them against constitutional attacks.
The modern conservative legal movement has been skeptical of those New
Deal judicial decisions ever since the movement’s birth in the 1970s. This
view is best represented by Boston University professor Gary Lawson’s
profoundly in uential 1994 article, “The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State,” which argued that several features of the administrative state are
unconstitutional. Yet, Lawson and a few others notwithstanding, legal
conservatives have generally been willing to accept the administrative
state’s existence and instead focus on ways to rein in its excesses.
Indeed, Chevron deference was originally thought to do just that. By
permitting agencies, rather than judges, to decide what ambiguous
statutes mean, conservative defenders of Chevron thought they would
create political accountability for agency actions through presidential
supervision. Three decades later, many legal conservatives have begun
doubting whether that rationale was sound. As Chief Justice Roberts,
quoting then-Professor Elena Kagan, noted in his City of Arlington dissent,
“no President (or his executive o ce sta ) could, and presumably none
would wish to, supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.”
In recent years, the sheer breadth of agency power, combined with
agencies’ “signi cant degree of independence” from elected o cials,
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appears to have catalyzed a reappraisal within the conservative legal
movement. Legal conservatives have begun advocating a complete
overhaul of the doctrine surrounding the administrative state, and this
trend has manifested itself in—and been in uenced by—conservative legal
scholarship.
Scholarly Challenges
Perhaps the two most important recent scholarly challenges have come
from Professors Michael McConnell and Philip Hamburger. McConnell—a
former federal appellate judge—authored a 2012 article with Professor
Nathan Chapman arguing that, under the original meaning of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the executive branch “could not
deprive anyone of a right except as authorized by law.” Although the article
does not appear on its face to be an attack on agency power, its authors
acknowledge its implications for the delegations of power inherent in the
modern administrative state: “at a certain point, broad delegations of
standardless power to the executive strain the understanding that the
executive can regulate conduct only pursuant to law.” It was no surprise,
then, to see Justice Thomas repeatedly rely on McConnell’s article in his
Association of American Railroads opinion to support his nondelegation
analysis.
But whereas McConnell’s article attacked the administrative state
indirectly, Hamburger’s 2014 book Is Administrative Law Unlawful? was a
frontal assault. Hamburger argues that several of the administrative state’s
main features are contrary to fundamental principles of the Anglo-
American legal tradition going back several centuries. Indeed, he tries to
show that many of those very principles were established in reaction
against some of the same arguments currently made in favor of agency
power. While McConnell hews closely to particular constitutional concepts
like due process in analyzing the administrative state, Hamburger makes a
broader critique based on what law is in the Anglo-American context.
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The book has had an electrifying e ect on the debate over agency power
since its publication, quickly becoming a must-read among legal
conservatives, and, like McConnell’s article, it played a central role in Justice
Thomas’s Association of American Railroads concurrence. The willingness of
the conservative justices to challenge the administrative state, then, is a
natural outgrowth of a more general reevaluation of agency power within
the conservative legal movement.
As of now, it does not appear that a majority of the Court is willing to go as
far in that reevaluation as Professor Hamburger or Justice Thomas, and
none of the opinions described here was joined by all the conservative
justices. But these and other opinions from the past term convey a strong
sense that the conservative justices are open to rethinking the scope and
power of the administrative state, with all the far-reaching implications that
would portend. Only subsequent cases will show whether this Supreme
Court term was an isolated tremor or the indicator of a much more
dramatic shakeup of agency power.
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